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FREEDOM DICTATED BY OCCUPATION? 
HOW DAHLIA V. RODRIGUEZ IMPACTS 
FREE SPEECH PROTECTION AFFORDED 
TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
Heidi Tong 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Burbank Police Department (BPD) officer, Angelo Dahlia, 
witnessed and made several attempts to report fellow officers for 
physically and verbally abusing individuals during suspect 
interviews.1 Dahlia’s complaints, however, resulted only in 
frustration with his supervisor’s lack of corrective action and threats 
directed toward Dahlia himself.2 Dahlia reported the injustice to 
BPD’s Internal Affairs.3 Immediately following Dahlia’s disclosure, 
BPD placed him on administrative leave.4 
Penalized for promoting BPD’s core values of respect, integrity, 
and excellence,5 Dahlia filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California alleging several claims, 
including retaliation against a public employee for disclosing police 
misconduct—violating the First Amendment.6 Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Dahlia’s speech was protected.7 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in Communication 
Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, June 2011. I would like to thank Professor Aaron 
Caplan for his guidance, incredible insight, and inspiring enthusiasm. I would also like to thank 
all the staffers and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Lastly, a special thank you 
to my family for their endless love and support.  
 1. Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1283 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 1064–65. 
 3. Id. at 1065. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Mission Statement, BURBANK POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://www.burbankpd.org 
/inside-bpd/mission-statement/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 6. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1065. 
 7. Id. at 1078. 
Dahlia v. Rodriguez 11/13/2014  2:01 PM 
1072 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1071 
There has been a longstanding legal debate about where to draw 
the line on First Amendment protection for public employees.8 
Precedent dictates that public employees are not entitled to First 
Amendment protection when the employees’ speech is made 
pursuant to their official duties.9 However, neither the legislature nor 
the courts have established a test to determine the scope of an 
employee’s official duties.10 Consequently, courts have struggled 
with the “official duties” rule, resulting in different approaches to 
determine what constitutes official duties.11 
Part II of this Comment presents the historical background of the 
First Amendment’s protection for public employees. Part III 
discusses the factual background of Dahlia v. Rodriguez.12 Part IV 
sets forth the reasoning the court adopted in holding that the First 
Amendment protected Dahlia’s speech. Part V analyzes the 
implications of the court’s adoption of the chain-of-command 
approach on which the Dahlia opinion relies and ultimately 
concludes that the approach should be abandoned.  
II.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held in McAuliffe v. 
Mayor of Bedford13 that a mayor had the right to terminate a police 
officer’s employment for expressing his political opinions.14 In doing 
so, Holmes declared that “[an officer] may have a constitutional right 
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman . . . [he] cannot complain, as he takes the employment on 
the terms which are offered him.”15 Since this declaration, the First 
Amendment’s protection, as it extends to public employees, has been 
the subject of much debate and development.16 
 
 8. See id. at 1067–69. 
 9. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006). 
 10. See Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 252 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 509 (2010). 
 11. See id. 
 12.  735 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014). 
 13. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).  
 14. Id. at 517–18. But see O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 716–
717 (1996) (“The [Supreme] Court has rejected for decades now the proposition that a public 
employee has no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First 
Amendment Rights . . . .”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Caroline Flynn, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue Exception to 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 MICH. L. REV. 759, 760–63 (2013). 
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Following a series of landmark cases that laid the foundation of 
First Amendment rights for public employees, the Supreme Court 
added a significant limitation to the original two-step analysis.17 To 
be protected by the First Amendment initially, public employees’ 
speech had to (1) address a matter of public concern and (2) 
demonstrate that the employees’ interests in the speech outweighed 
the employer’s administrative concerns.18 In 2006, however, Garcetti 
v. Ceballos19 added an additional rule.20 Garcetti denied First 
Amendment protection to a deputy district attorney who submitted to 
his superior a memo explaining the inaccuracies of an affidavit.21 
The Garcetti court reasoned that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for the First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”22 By supplanting the original two-step analysis with an 
additional “official duties” rule, the decision significantly diminished 
the scope of protection afforded to public employees.23 
In adding this new bright-line rule, however, Garcetti failed to 
define the scope of the term “official duties.”24 The undefined term 
resulted in lower courts applying a variety of inconsistent tests.25 
Dahlia v. Rodriguez attempted to fill the void left by Garcetti by 
implementing a chain-of-command approach to determine the scope 
of official duties.26   
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BPD assigned Dahlia to assist in the investigation of an armed 
robbery at Porto’s Bakery & Café in Burbank, California on 
December 28, 2007.27 Lieutenant Jon Murphy supervised the 
 
 17. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 514. 
 18. Id. at 511–13. 
 19. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 20. See id. at 421. 
 21. Id. at 424. 
 22. Id. at 421. 
 23. Flynn, supra note 16, at 760–61. 
 24. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
 25. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 515–16. 
 26. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1283 (2014). 
 27. Id. at 1063. 
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investigation.28 On Dahlia’s second day assisting in the investigation, 
he witnessed a higher-ranked Burbank police officer, Lieutenant 
Omar Rodriguez, grab one of the suspects’ throat, place the barrel of 
his handgun under the suspect’s eye and state, “How does it feel to 
have a gun in your face motherfucker[?]”29 That same day, Dahlia 
overheard yelling and the sounds of a suspect being slapped coming 
from a room where another investigator, Sergeant Edgar Penaranda, 
was interviewing another suspect for the same offense.30 
After Rodriguez saw the shock on Dahlia’s face, the Burbank 
Officers (“Defendant Officers”) quickly proceeded to exclude Dahlia 
from engaging in subsequent suspect interviews and began to take 
exclusive control of the investigation.31 Prohibiting all other 
personnel from walking past the interview rooms, Defendant 
Officers continued to assault and beat suspects, evidenced by 
booking photos of suspects.32 Dahlia reported the improper conduct 
and his lack of control over the investigation to Murphy.33 Murphy 
responded by instructing Dahlia to “stop his sniveling.”34 Dahlia met 
with Murphy twice more after this incident, pleading for an end to 
“the madness.”35 Despite Dahlia’s many complaints, Defendant 
Officers continued to physically and verbally abuse suspects.36 
Four months after the Porto’s investigation commenced, BDP’s 
Internal Affairs decided to examine the investigation for any 
unlawful physical abuse.37 Defendant Officers learned of the 
impending investigation and, upon such notice, threatened Dahlia 
daily to ensure that he would remain silent on the matter.38 
Specifically, Defendant Officers “incessantly harassed, intimidated 
and threatened Dahlia over the following weeks, to the point where 
his working conditions were ‘fully consumed’ by the intimidation.”39 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 1063–64. 
 31. Id. at 1064. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
Dahlia v. Rodriguez 11/13/2014  2:01 PM 
2014] DAHLIA V. RODRIGUEZ 1075 
Nearly one year after the start of Defendant Officers’ 
misconduct, Rodriguez instructed Dahlia to enter his office, wherein 
Rodriguez reached for his own gun, stared at Dahlia, and placed his 
gun in a drawer.40 Rodriguez then leaned into Dahlia and said, “Fuck 
with me and I will put a case on you, and put you in jail.”41 As a 
result of Rodriguez’s aggressive behavior, Dahlia informed the 
Burbank Police Officers’ Association (BPOA) of his encounter with 
Rodriguez.42 Then, the BPOA reported it to the Burbank City 
Manager.43 In a May interview with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department, Dahlia disclosed the Defendant Officers’ misconduct.44 
Four days following that interview, Dahlia was placed on 
administrative leave pending discipline.45 
Thereafter, Dahlia filed an action against Defendant Officers 
and the City of Burbank in district court, alleging several claims, 
including violation of the First Amendment.46 Defendant Officers 
moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.47 The district 
court held that the claim was barred because the First Amendment 
did not protect Dahlia’s speech.48 Dahlia appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s ruling.49 
Following a majority vote of eligible judges, the Ninth Circuit 
reheard the case en banc.50 
IV.  THE REASONING OF THE COURT 
On appeal, Defendant Officers relied on Huppert v. City of 
Pittsburg,51 which held that police officers’ official duties included 
reporting police misconduct.52 Based on Huppert, Defendant 
Officers argued that Dahlia acted within his official duties and 
therefore was not protected by the First Amendment.53 Dahlia 
 
 40. Id. at 1065. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1066. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 52. Id. at 707. 
 53. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1071. 
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counter-argued that to remain consistent with the principles set forth 
in Garcetti, the court would have to overrule Huppert and deem 
Dahlia’s speech protected by the First Amendment.54 Dahlia asserted 
that under Garcetti’s official duties rule, Dahlia’s speech fell outside 
of the realm of his official duties as a police officer and thus 
deserved First Amendment protection.55 
The court agreed with Dahlia and overruled Huppert to abide by 
Garcetti’s official duties rule.56 Furthermore, the court established 
factors to determine the scope of an employee’s official duties.57 
These factors are: (1) whether the employee communicated with 
individuals outside his chain of command, (2) the subject matter of 
the communication, and (3) whether the employee was speaking in 
direct contravention to his supervisor’s orders.58 
Based on these factors, the court found that, construing the 
complaint in Dahlia’s favor, Dahlia’s speech fell outside of the scope 
of official duties and therefore merited First Amendment 
protection.59 The court subsequently decided that Dahlia sufficiently 
stated a claim, and reversed the district court’s ruling.60 The Ninth 
Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its 
findings.61 
The Ninth Circuit first looked to the analysis set forth in 
Garcetti to determine whether the First Amendment protected 
Dahlia’s speech.62 The Court in Garcetti held that the First 
Amendment does not protect statements made pursuant to an 
officer’s official duties.63 Although Garcetti rejected broad job 
descriptions and mandated a fact-specific inquiry to determine the 
scope of official duties, it did not provide a specific test.64 
 
 54. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 10-55978 Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BTiSKFx5_98. 
 55. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1077. 
 56. Id. at 1063. 
 57. Id. at 1074. 
 58. Id. at 1074–75. 
 59. Id. at 1077–78. 
 60. Id. at 1080. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1068. 
 63. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 64. See id. at 424; see Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1068–69. 
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Accordingly, the court referred to Huppert to define the scope of 
official duties.65 Employed as an officer of the Pittsburg Police 
Department (PPD), Ron Huppert was subpoenaed to testify before a 
grand jury investigating corruption within the PPD.66 The court in 
Huppert found that officers were acting pursuant to their official 
duties by investigating and reporting police corruption.67 The 
Huppert court relied on Christal v. Police Commission of City and 
County of San Francisco68 as a shortcut to automatically classify 
whistleblowing as part of an officer’s official duties.69 
Huppert followed Christal’s sweeping, generalized definition to 
determine the scope an officer’s official duties rather than 
conducting Garcetti’s fact-specific inquiry.70 Dahlia determined that 
Huppert incorrectly relied on the general job description in Christal, 
which stated that an officer’s official duties included the duty to 
“testify freely” concerning facts before a grand jury.71 Distinguishing 
Christal from Huppert, Dahlia stated that Christal was solely limited 
to whether police officers “could assert their Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and still remain police officers.”72 Unlike 
Christal, which concerned a Fifth Amendment claim, Huppert 
concerned a First Amendment claim.73 Consequently, Dahlia 
overruled Huppert for improperly relying on Christal.74 
Left without Huppert’s definition of official duties, the court set 
forth the three aforementioned factors, consisting of whether the 
communication fell outside the chain of command, the subject matter 
of the communication, and whether the communication was a 
contravention of orders.  The court examined these three factors to 
determine whether Dahlia’s speech fell within the scope of an 
officer’s official duties.75 
 
 65. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1069–70. 
 66. Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 698–701 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 67. Leslie Pope, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of Police Officers’ 
Subpoenaed Testimony After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 YALE L.J. 2143, 2143–44 (2010). 
 68. 92 P.2d 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939). 
 69. Id. at 419; Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1070. 
 70. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1070–71. 
 71. Id.; Christal, 92 P.2d at 419. 
 72. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1071. 
 73. Id. at 1070–71. 
 74. Id. at 1071. 
 75. Id. at 1074–75. 
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The Ninth Circuit determined that the first factor, whether the 
employee communicated with individuals outside his chain of 
command, weighed in Dahlia’s favor.76 By speaking to BPD’s 
Internal Affairs officers, Dahlia communicated outside of his chain 
of command.77 The majority determined that “it [was] reasonable to 
infer that Dahlia did not have a duty to report threats to his union . . . 
clearly [speaking] outside the chain of command.”78 The court stated 
that this chain-of-command factor was “a relevant, if not necessarily 
dispositive, factor in determining whether he spoke pursuant to his 
official duties.”79 Consequently, the court abstained from analyzing 
the second and third factors.80 The court held that, construing the 
complaint in favor of Dahlia, his speech was protected, and the court 
reversed both the district court’s and three judge panel’s ruling.81  
V.  ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION 
OF THE CHAIN-OF-COMMAND ANALYSIS  
While Garcetti held that a public employee’s speech would not 
be protected if the speech was made pursuant to the employee’s 
official duties, it left the determination of the scope of official duties 
to the lower courts.82 The Dahlia court attempted to clarify Garcetti 
by providing three factors to determine the scope of official duties.83 
Of these factors, the court focused its analysis on the first factor and 
adopted a “de facto” chain-of-command approach.84 Although 
Dahlia’s speech was protected, this was the result of his reporting to 
an outside agency.85 Many misconduct reports, however, may likely 
be conveyed to a direct supervisor and consequently will be subject 
to First Amendment limitations. Accordingly, this approach 
represents a misapplication of Garcetti that undercuts the principles 
Garcetti sought to implement.86 As evidenced by other courts’ use of 
 
 76. Id. at 1077–78. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1077. 
 79. Id. at 1074. 
 80. See id. at 1077–78. 
 81. Id. at 1080. 
 82. Wiese, supra note 10, at 509. 
 83. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074–76. 
 84. Id. at 1074–78. 
 85. Id. at 1077–78. 
 86. Id. at 1080–83 (Pregerson, J., concurring). 
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alternative approaches,87 the weight that the Dahlia court bestowed 
on an employee’s communication, or lack thereof, with individuals 
within the chain of command presents significant consequences and 
complications for public employees, as well as the lower courts. 
A.  The Chain-of-Command Analysis Undermines 
the Principles Set Forth in Garcetti  
The objective of the Garcetti decision is to ensure that courts 
balance deference to government employers’ daily operations, while 
still providing an individual citizen a platform to speak out on 
matters of public concern.88 Due to the nature of the trusted positions 
public employees frequently hold, employees who enter into public 
employment are subject to more limitations on their First 
Amendment rights.89 By adopting the chain-of-command approach, 
the court in Dahlia thwarts the main balancing objective set forth in 
Garcetti. 
The controlling rationale behind public employees being subject 
to more limitations on their First Amendment rights is government 
efficiency.90 Without some degree of control over their employees, 
government employers are unable to provide citizens with efficient 
public services.91 Public employees often occupy trusted positions in 
the community.92 In such trusted positions, there is a concern that a 
public employee may voice an opinion that could encroach on 
government policies or impair government functions if given 
unlimited First Amendment protection.93 This does not, however, 
completely bar public employees from civic discourse. Rather, 
Garcetti simply does not grant public employees “a right to perform 
their jobs however they see fit.”94 
Nevertheless, a criticism of this policy is that prohibiting public 
employees from speaking on matters of public concern deprives 
citizens of informed opinions on such matters.95 Public employees 
 
 87. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 515–16; see also Flynn, supra note 16, at 771 (discussing 
the different approaches courts have used to evaluate public employees’ First Amendment rights). 
 88. Flynn, supra note 16, at 767–68. 
 89. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 418. 
 92. Id. at 419. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 422. 
 95. Id. at 420 (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004)). 
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are frequently in “the best position to know what ails the agencies for 
which they work” and are best able to utilize their informed opinions 
to contribute significantly to public debates.96 As such, courts are 
placed in a delicate yet essential position to strike a balance between 
promoting both individual and societal interests served by a public 
employee’s free speech.97 
Taking these two adverse interests into account, the emphasis 
that the Ninth Circuit placed on the chain-of-command analysis 
undermines Garcetti’s underlying rationale of government 
efficiency. Garcetti implemented restrictions on public employees’ 
First Amendment protection to promote efficiency of government 
services, while still affording public employees a right to engage in 
civic discourse.98 Dahlia’s chain-of-command analysis, however, 
runs counter to these goals.  
The Dahlia court failed to consider that in order to promote the 
aims of Garcetti, it benefits both the government and society to allow 
employees to report up the chain of command, without fear of being 
subject to retaliation.99 First, public employees’ communication with 
their supervisors promotes efficiency.100 Presumably, a supervisor is 
in the best position to know the information and subsequent actions 
necessary to resolve any issue brought to his or her attention.101 
Involving multiple outside parties to avoid reporting up the chain of 
command may only serve to confuse or distort the situation at 
hand.102 Disclosure to a supervisor keeps the conflict within the 
agency.103 
Second, a government employee’s ability to disclose potential 
misconduct to his superiors strengthens the public’s confidence in 
law enforcement.104 Without this freedom, the public may think that 
 
 96. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). 
 97. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Garcetti 547 U.S. at 427–29 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674 
(emphasizing the benefits to society and government agencies of First Amendment protection for 
public employees). 
 100. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wiese, supra note 10, at 
528 (discussing why public employees’ communication with supervisors promotes efficiency). 
 101. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wiese, supra note 10, at 
528 (discussing why public employees’ communication with supervisors promotes efficiency). 
 102. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 528. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (Pregerson, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014). 
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officers are simply turning their heads to ongoing police 
corruption.105 An officer’s ability to report police misconduct 
without fear significantly diminishes the chance that the public will 
perceive law enforcement as a corrupt agency.106 
With these policies in mind, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion undermines the principles that Garcetti sets forth.107 Rather 
than incentivizing and promoting government efficiency and societal 
interests, the majority opinion traps officers in a catch-22—either 
violate their duty to report to their supervisors and receive First 
Amendment protection, or adhere to their duty and expose 
themselves to employment retaliation.108 Indeed, as a result of 
Dahlia, officers who find themselves in a position akin to Dahlia’s 
will be forced to choose between sacrificing the public interest and 
work efficiency (by not reporting up their chain of command), or 
adhering to their duty and risking employer retaliation.109 The court 
has essentially asked officers to choose between the public interest 
and their own self-interest.110 In sum, it is this predicament in which 
an officer may find himself that warrants abandoning the  
chain-of-command analysis. 
B.  Alternative Methods to the  
Chain-of-Command Analysis 
Other circuits’ decisions to refrain from adopting the  
chain-of-command approach evidences that others view the law and 
policy advanced by Dahlia negatively.111 Consequently, courts have 
adopted other approaches, such as the civilian-analogue exception 
and the assigned-responsibilities approach.112  
1.  The Civilian-Analogue Exception  
One alternative to the chain-of-command approach is the 
civilian-analogue exception.113 Under this exception, a public 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 1083. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 1082–83. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Wiese, supra note 10, at 519 & n.96; see also Flynn, supra note 16, at 772 
(discussing the Second Circuit’s adoption of the Civilian Analogue Approach). 
 112. Wiese, supra note 10, at 519; Flynn, supra note 16, at 772. 
 113. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241–42 (2d Cir. 2011); Flynn, supra note 16, at 772. 
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employee’s act is protected if a civilian would be able to perform the 
same act.114 In Jackler v. Byrne,115 the Second Circuit held that the 
plaintiff’s refusal to comply with orders to issue false statements to 
hide police misconduct had a civilian analogue.116 The court 
reasoned that any citizen could report a police officer.117 Even 
though the officer’s actions were part of his official duties, there was 
a civilian analogue, and thus, his actions warranted First Amendment 
protection.118 
There is an argument, however, that when an “employee speaks 
as an employee, ‘there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens 
who are not government employees,’ and thus normal First 
Amendment protections for citizens should not apply.”119 Therefore, 
Jackler’s civilian-analogue exception is not without its faults, and 
only one of the many alternatives courts have implemented. 
2.  The Assigned-Responsibilities Approach 
Other courts, including those in the Ninth Circuit, have adopted 
the assigned-responsibilities approach to define the scope of a public 
employee’s official duties.120 Using this approach, courts examine 
whether the employee was required to engage in speech as part of his 
official duties.121  
For example, Marable v. Nitchman122 focused its analysis on the 
assigned responsibilities of the employee.123 Marable was an 
engineer for Washington State Ferries and began witnessing 
allegedly “corrupt financial schemes.”124 Consequently, Marable 
reported the misconduct to the Chief Executive Officer, the 
Department of Transportation auditor, the State Executive Ethics 
Board, and his supervisor.125 The Marable court concluded “that 
Marable had no official duty to ensure that his supervisors were 
 
 114. See Flynn, supra note 16, at 774–75. 
 115. 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 116. Flynn, supra note 16, at 774. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 775. 
 119. Wiese, supra note 10, at 515 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)). 
 120. Id. at 519–20. 
 121. See Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 122. 511 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 123. Id. at 932–33. 
 124. Id. at 926, 933. 
 125. Wiese, supra note 10, at 520. 
Dahlia v. Rodriguez 11/13/2014  2:01 PM 
2014] DAHLIA V. RODRIGUEZ 1083 
refraining from the alleged corrupt practices.”126 Thus, the court 
rejected defendant Nitchman’s motion for summary judgment, 
stating that the speech was not part of Marable’s official duties.127 
The Marable court’s decision contrasts with the decision in 
Freitag v. Ayeres.128 Freitag was a correctional officer for the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 
who had witnessed inmates engaging in inappropriate sexual 
exhibitionist acts.129 In response, Freitag submitted several internal 
reports, disciplinary reports, and various other documents to CDCR 
officials, the California State Senator, and the California Office of 
the Inspector General.130 The Freitag court determined that the 
internal reports to CDCR officials were “pursuant to [Freitag’s] 
duties as a correctional officer and thus not in her capacity as a 
citizen.”131 The court determined that her communications to the 
Senator and Inspector General, however, were protected because 
Freitag was not acting in her official capacity in making these 
communications.132 
Both courts in Marable and Freitag implemented the  
assigned-responsibilities analysis.133 Rather than looking to whom 
the speech was directed, this alternative approach asks the questions: 
“What are the responsibilities that correspond to this plaintiff’s 
position, and can the communication be considered part of these 
responsibilities?”134 While the result in Freitag would have been the 
same if the court had applied a chain-of-command analysis, Marable 
would have resulted in the opposite outcome. Marable’s 
communication to the Chief Executive Officer would have been 
within Marable’s chain of command, and thus, would not have been 
protected. Prohibiting an engineer like Marable from speaking to his 
superior about finances, a subject completely detached from his 
actual work responsibilities, runs counter to Garcetti’s principles. 
 
 126. Marable, 511 F.3d at 933. 
 127. Id. at 926, 932–33. 
 128. Compare id. at 929, 932 (holding that a defendant’s internal reports of misconduct was 
outside scope of official duties), with Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that a defendant’s internal reports of misconduct was within scope of official duties). 
 129. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 532–34. 
 130. Id. at 532–35. 
 131. Id. at 546. 
 132. Id. at 545–46. 
 133. Wiese, supra note 10, at 520–21. 
 134. See id. at 521. 
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Thus, the chain-of-command approach should not be as dispositive 
as the Dahlia court suggested.   
C.  The Chain-of-Command Analysis Could  
Lead To Inconsistent Results  
for Different Public Employees  
Dahlia’s chain-of-command analysis presents further 
implications if this approach is applied to public employees who, 
unlike police officers, may not have a distinct hierarchical 
employment structure.  
While most employees do have supervisors, the structure of the 
police department consists of direct rankings in a military-like 
fashion, each officer knowing who is above and below him.135 
Teachers, in contrast, are employed within a much less distinct 
hierarchy.136 Several teachers report to one principal. Possibly 
excluded from this two-tier hierarchy are administration staff, 
educational support, and other ad hoc committees.137 Thus, a 
question becomes immediately apparent: what happens when a 
teacher reports misconduct to someone other than the principal? Do 
members of an ad hoc committee or administrative staff constitute 
individuals within the teacher’s chain of command?  
This wrinkle in the chain-of-command analysis creates an unfair 
advantage to public employees who do not have a strict vertical 
hierarchy. If personnel other than the principal, such as an ad hoc 
committee member, were labeled as outside the chain of command, 
teachers would be more likely to encounter someone not within the 
chain of command. This would result in varying degrees of 
protection for different types of public employees. 
Rather than have an individual’s occupation determine the 
limitations on his or her First Amendment protection, it is better 
policy to give all public employees the same quality of protection. 
Allowing certain employment fields to have more First Amendment 
limitations may deter individuals from entering those employment 
 
 135. See The LAPD Career Ladder, JOINLAPD, http://joinlapd.com/career_ladder.html (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 136. Cf. Nirav S., What Are Hierarchies in the School System? PRESERVE ARTICLES, http:// 
www.preservearticles.com/2012011120547/what-are-hierarchies-in-the-school-system.html (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating schools comprise of different available positions depending on each 
school’s unique needs and employ contrasting models of hierarchies). 
 137. See id. 
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fields for fear of being retaliated against. Additionally, the lack of a 
specific test to determine who is within a public employee’s chain of 
command leaves this uncharted territory to the discretion of lower 
courts. This absence could lead to courts’ conflicting views about 
who is within an employee’s chain of command. The anticipated 
possibility of inconsistent and uncertain applications of the  
chain-of-command analysis thus warrants the disposal of the  
chain-of-command approach.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Rather than utilizing the chain-of-command approach, the court 
could have simply found guidance in Garcetti’s statement that 
official duties are tasks that an “employee actually is expected to 
perform.”138 Even if a public employee is expected to report up his 
chain of command, he is not expected to contradict his supervisor’s 
orders. Accordingly, because Dahlia spoke in direct opposition to his 
instructions, Garcetti’s “expected to perform” statement alone 
suggests that Dahlia’s speech does not fall within his official duties. 
Therefore, Dahlia’s speech warranted protection under the First 
Amendment. 
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the chain-of-command approach 
not only undercuts the principles set forth by Garcetti but also 
presents significant implications for future applications and public 
employees’ constitutional rights. For these reasons, the chain-of-














 138. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006). 
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